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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on business performance by investigating
the relationship between terrorism and global business performance at country
level. A measure of a country's distance from the frontier score of the World
Bank's Doing Business index is used to proxy for business performance. The results
of the fixed-effects estimations based on 173 countries over 7 years (2009–2017)
show that terrorism has no significant relationship with global business perfor-
mance. We then partition our sample into developed, developing and fragile coun-
tries. The results still show that there is no robust significant relationship between
terrorism and business performance for the sub-samples of developed and devel-
oping countries. However, the results based on the fragile countries' sub-sample
suggest a significant negative relationship between terrorism and business
performance. The results are consistent with an alternative measure of business
performance and estimation technique that controls for endogeneity.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Terrorism incurs significant economic as well as human
costs. For example, the global economic impact of terror-
ism reached US$89.6 billion in 2015, which was only 15%
less than the year before—when it was $105.6 billion.
Overall, the costs arising from terrorism have increased
11-fold over the past 15 years (Dudley, 2016). The human
cost of terrorism is equally staggering given that, globally,
deaths from terrorism rose from just over 11,000 in 2007
to over 26,000 in 2017. Over the same time period, terror
attacks rose from about 2,800 in 2007 to approximately
11,000 in 2017. Among the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries,
deaths increased over 900% between 2007 and 2016, with
the largest increases occurring in Turkey, France, the
United States, and Belgium (Institute for Economics and
Peace, 2016).
The growing economic and human cost of terrorism
has led to many empirical studies seeking to establish the
impact of terrorism on business performance
(e.g., Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Aslam & Kang, 2015;
Chen & Siems, 2004; Chesney, Reshetar, & Karaman, 2011;
Drakos, 2004, 2010; Graham & Ramiah, 2012; Ito &
Lee, 2005; Procasky & Ujah, 2016). Collectively these stud-
ies evince that terrorism has a negative impact on business
performance although the impact is often reversed either in
the short run or long run. For example, focusing on the
effect of terrorism on the tourism sector, Pizam and
Smith (2000) found that a large portion of the terrorism
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incidents (79%) caused a significant decline in tourism
demand that lasted from 1 month to 6 months, with recov-
ery in approximately 50% of the cases within 3 months.
In their study on the effects of terrorism on the
London and Athens stock markets Kollias, Papadamou,
and Stagiannis (2011), p. s75), concluded that
in very broad terms, the findings of our event
study methodology do not seem to point to
any clear and unequivocal picture or pattern
and no significant and notable change over
time has emerged in terms of abnormal
returns in either market. In line with other
studies, the effects generally appear to be
transitory in both markets.
Despite the largely consistent findings by existing
studies, our knowledge of the relationship between ter-
rorism and business performance is still limited for a
number of reasons; hence the need for our study. First,
current studies mainly focus on the effects of terrorism
on the share prices of firms listed on stock exchanges
(e.g., Arif & Sulemon, 2017; Drakos, 2004; Ito &
Lee, 2005; Ramiah, Cam, Calabro, Maher, &
Ghafouri, 2010) or the tourism sector (e.g., Araña &
León, 2008; Llorca-Vivero, 2008; Pizam & Smith, 2000;
Yaya, 2009). Unlike previous studies, this paper seeks to
relate the effects of terrorism to business performance at
a country level rather than at firm/sector level as
established by prior evidence. This highlights the overall
aggregate impact of terrorism on the aggregate perfor-
mance of businesses in a country. The main advantage of
this approach is that it captures the general business envi-
ronment in each country rather than at firm/sector level
and, therefore, proxies business performance from all
firms, both listed and unlisted. This is the first time such
evidence has been established in the current literature.
Second, despite the suggestions that terrorism may
affect business performance in developing and fragile
(failed) countries differently (e.g., Essaddam &
Karagianis, 2013; Llorca-Vivero, 2008; Piazza, 2008; Proc-
asky & Ujah, 2016) very few but contradictory studies
exist. For example, in respect of the developing/devel-
oped dichotomy, Procasky and Ujah (2016) found that
terrorism results in a higher cost of debt for the country's
sovereign risk and, by extension, the firms in the
impacted countries. Moreover, the impact was more pro-
nounced in developing markets where the authors found
that a comparable two-point increase in terrorism on
average resulted in an entire notch downgrade in the sov-
ereign credit rating of the country. Essaddam and
Karagianis (2013) found that firms operating in wealth-
ier, or more democratic countries, face greater volatility
in stock returns relative to firms in developing countries.
Conversely, Llorca-Vivero (2008) found that the negative
consequences of terrorism are greater in developing
countries. The contradictory evidence from Essaddam
and Karagianis (2013) and Llorca-Vivero (2008) means
that it is not clear whether developed or developing coun-
tries are impacted more by terrorism.
In respect of fragile countries, we found no study
that has examined whether terrorism affects these
countries differently given the severity of terrorism
incidents in such countries. The severity of such ter-
rorism incidents is due to these countries' lack of abil-
ity to project power internally; they also have
incompetent and corrupt law enforcement capabilities,
which create opportunities for terrorist groups to pene-
trate, recruit and operate within them at lower cost
and with little government interference or scrutiny
(Piazza, 2008). For instance, Al-Qaeda and other ter-
rorist groups are using the southern region of Afghani-
stan as a secure base to mass-produce trained
terrorists due to the region's inability to project power
internally (Stephen, 2006). Given that businesses have
long been the favourite targets of these attacks, there
have been several calls for the need for research and
policy to focus more on these countries (Bader, Berg, &
Holtbrügge, 2015; Newman, 2007; Piazza, 2008).
Against this backdrop, the paper is motivated to
determine whether the effect of terrorism on business
performance may vary depending on whether the coun-
try is classified as developed, developing or fragile. We
argue that the effect of terrorism in these countries may
depend on how they are classified because of the exis-
tence of institutional voids, which tend to be very perva-
sive and undermine the conduct of international
businesses operating in these regions (Doh, Rodrigues,
Saka-Helmhout, & Makhija, 2017; Mair & Marti, 2009;
Suder, Reade, Riviere, Birnik, & Nielsen, 2017). “Institu-
tional voids” refer to conditions where institutional
arrangements needed to support normal functioning of
the market are absent, or weak, or fail to accomplish the
role expected of them (Mair & Marti, 2009). This often
results in higher cost of doing business. Most fragile
states are characterized by sustained degradation of pre-
conditions relevant for markets to exist as well such as
governance structure, rules of exchange (Fligstein, 2001)
and autonomy (McMillan, 2002) as well as the institu-
tions needed for the market to function well—that is,
governance mechanism, disclosure requirements and
functioning judiciary (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Rotberg, 2003). In more severe
cases of institutional voids, multinational enterprises
(MNEs) are better able to fill these voids for their host
countries, which often create high costs for these firms
(Doh et al., 2017; Oetzel & Getz, 2012). We argue that the
combination of high security risk and severe institutional
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voids, where businesses are learning to adapt to dangerous
and high-risk environments whilst operating and
protecting staff and assets, makes fragile countries an
extreme business environment. Given that the challenges
in developing countries and fragile countries particularly
are very difficult to tackle, it is interesting to find out how
terrorism affects businesses in such an environment.
In order to achieve our objective, we used a panel of
173 countries over the period 2009–2017. To capture
business performance, the World Bank's Doing Business
index was used. The distance to the frontier score bench-
marks economies with respect to regulatory best practice
across several indicators that cover topics on areas of
Doing Business. A country's distance to the frontier score
illustrates the extent of the gap between the economy
and the regulatory frontier at any given time (World
Bank, 2017). We, therefore, argue that economies that
are farther away from the frontier are more likely to per-
form better. Our justification for this argument stems
from the characteristics of the topics on areas of doing
business1 used in constructing the frontier. The results
of the fixed-effects estimations show that terrorism has
no significant impact on global business performance for
the full sample, developed and developing countries.
However, terrorism has a significant negative relation-
ship with business performance in fragile countries.
The study contributes to the literature in a number of
ways. First, our study contributes by examining the rela-
tionship between terrorism and global business perfor-
mance at country level rather than at firm level
(e.g., Chesney et al., 2011; Drakos, 2004, 2010). We achieved
this by utilizing the World Bank's Doing Business index as a
proxy for global business performance. By estimating busi-
ness performance at country level, it means that we are able
to approximate the general performance of all businesses
within a particular country regardless of industry or listing
status. Second, the study also contributes by providing evi-
dence of the impact of terrorism on business performance
in developed and developing countries. Our findings add to
very limited and contradictory evidence (e.g., Essaddam &
Karagianis, 2013; Llorca-Vivero, 2008; Procasky &
Ujah, 2016) on whether terrorism has different effects on
business performance in developed and developing coun-
tries. Contrary to existing results, our results suggest that
terrorism does not affect business performance in either
developed or developing countries. Finally, despite studies
on the relationship between terrorism and economic perfor-
mance in individual fragile countries (e.g., Khan &
Estrada, 2016; Shahzad, Zakaria, Rehman, Ahmed, &
Fida, 2016), ours is the first to provide evidence of how ter-
rorism affects business performance in fragile countries.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
reviews the literature on terrorism and business failure. In
Section 3, the data are defined and the models outlined.
Section 4 presents the empirical results followed by a dis-
cussion. The summary and conclusions are in Section 5.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 | Empirical evidence on terrorism
and business performance
Many empirical studies seek to establish the impact of ter-
rorism on business performance (e.g., Abadie &
Gardeazabal, 2008; Aslam & Kang, 2015; Chen & Siems,
2004; Chesney et al., 2011; Drakos, 2004, 2010; Graham &
Ramiah, 2012; Ito & Lee, 2005; Procasky & Ujah, 2016;
Tingbani, Okafor, Tauringana, & Zalata, 2019). The collec-
tive evidence suggests a significant relationship between
terrorism and business performance. For instance, Arif and
Sulemon (2017) found a significant mixed positive and neg-
ative impact of terrorism on stock prices of different sectors
on the Karachi Stock Exchange. In a related study, Araña
and León (2008) also found the 9/11 attacks caused a shock
to tourists' utility and that some destinations experienced a
strongly negative impact on their image and attractiveness,
while others upgraded as a consequence of the terrorism.
Similarly, Arin, Ciferri, and Spagnolo (2008) provided
evidence that the response to terror shocks varies across
the six countries investigated (Indonesia, Israel, Spain,
Thailand, Turkey and the UK). Specifically, they found
that Spain and the UK are generally less affected by ter-
ror shocks, which suggested that financial investors in
these two countries are more resilient to these events.
Very recently, Tingbani et al. (2019) investigated the
impact of terrorism on global business failure. Evidence
from their fixed-effects estimations reveals a significantly
negative relationship between terrorism and business
failure. Specifically, the authors found the impact to be
more pervasive in developing and fragile states. Unlike
Tingbani et al. (2019), though, our study focuses on
performance rather than on business failure.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section, which is
mainly based on stock markets' and tourism industries'
reaction to terrorism incidents, shows that there is an initial
negative reaction. However, much of the reviewed literature
also suggests that the negative reaction is reversed either in
the short term or the long term. There is also limited evi-
dence from these studies that the reaction to incidences of
terrorism will differ according to whether the country
involved is a developed or a developing one, and the sever-
ity of the attack. However, despite the suggestion that the
severity of terrorism incidents can impact performance dif-
ferently, there is no empirical evidence as to whether terror-
ism has a different effect on fragile states where terrorism
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incidents are on-going. Thus, besides adding empirical evi-
dence to the limited research on the relationship between
terrorism and global business performance, the paper also
contributes by providing evidence on how terrorism affects
business performance in fragile countries.
2.2 | Hypotheses development
2.2.1 | Terrorism and global business
performance
Several prior studies provided a range of theoretical and
empirical evidence to establish a link between terrorism
and business performance. The growing evidence sug-
gests that terrorism induces both direct and indirect
costs, which adversely affect business performance.
Lenain, Bonturi, and Koen (2002) contended that, during
periods of terror attacks, resources devoted to improving
security in both public and private sectors may crowd out
more productive spending, thereby raising the cost of
capital and labour. Such adverse business conditions
exert differential impacts on business performance both
in the short run and in the long run (Liu, 2009).
Similarly, the fear of terrorism also limits investment
to drive business growth. Becker and Rubinstein (2004)
argued that the fear of terrorism heightens the level of
uncertainty in the market, which adversely impacts on
consumer behaviour and the firm's investment decisions
(see Drakos, 2010). According to Sandler and
Enders (2008), the immediate cost of terrorism is local-
ized, thereby causing a substitution of economic activities
from relatively vulnerable sectors to relatively safer sec-
tors. This substitution allows large diversified firms to
cushion their losses. Consumer choices are also likely to
be affected due to the likelihood of been harmed through
a terror attack (Greenbaum, Dugan, & LaFree, 2007).
Terrorism also hinders the performance of businesses
by raising the cost of doing business in terms of higher
wages and greater expenditure on security. Brodeur (2017)
contended that the overall psychological effect of the risk
of a future terror attack and the direct cost of increased
airport security have an adverse economic consequence
on business survival and growth. Other costs (including
security and surveillance expenditure, repairs and
replacement of stolen properties) adversely deplete the
already scarce financial resources, which may result in
adverse business performance (Fernandez, 2008).
On the other hand, the fear of uncertainty under such
conditions most likely creates a beneficial environmental
jolt for firms to ensure they thrive (Carter & Auken, 2006).
For instance, following the September 11th attack,
homeowners in Ohio increased their preference for lower-
density housing. Zycher (2003) found that after the
September 11th attack there was a significant increase in
demand for security and technology-related businesses,
whilst tourism-related businesses experienced a decline in
demand. Drakos and Kutan (2003) found a similar drop in
demand for tourism in those Mediterranean countries that
had experienced terror attacks, and a significant rise in
destinations deemed to be safer. Furthermore, it is also
been argued that differences in resources between coun-
tries could cushion the effect of terrorism or speed up
recovery from either a large-scale attack or prolonged
attack (Sandler & Enders, 2008). Given the overall indirect
and direct costs associated with terrorism and the fact that
it creates a beneficial environmental jolt for firms to thrive
and maximize their performance, we expect terrorism to
significantly affect business performance. Against this
backdrop, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H1 Terrorism is significantly associated with global busi-
ness performance.
2.2.2 | Terrorism and business
performance in developed and developing
countries
The conceptual case for expecting a significant relation-
ship between terrorism and business performance is based
on the suggestion that the fear of terrorism heightens the
level of uncertainty in the market, which significantly
impacts on consumer behaviour and the firm's investment
decisions (Becker & Rubinstein, 2004; Drakos, 2010). How-
ever, in this section, we highlight that the impact of terror-
ism on global business performance is likely to vary from
one country to another due to the existence of institutional
voids, which tend to influence the conduct and perfor-
mance of businesses (Doh et al., 2017; Mair & Marti, 2009;
Suder et al., 2017). “Institutional voids” refer to conditions
where institutional arrangements needed to support nor-
mal functioning of the market are absent, or weak, or fail
to accomplish the role expected of them (Mair &
Marti, 2009). This often results in higher costs of doing
business. We postulate that the severity of the impact of
terrorism incidents on business performance depends on
the level of institutional voids countries face. Liu (2009)
contended that institutional voids exert differential
impacts on business performance both in the short run
and in the long run (Liu, 2009). For example, Llorca-
Vivero (2008) suggested that terrorism has greater adverse
effects in developing countries due to the sustained
degradation of preconditions relevant for markets to exist.
In a related study, Procasky and Ujah (2016) indicated
that, compared to developed countries, businesses in
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developing countries are likely to experience more effects
of terrorism in terms of high insurance costs. Unlike most
developed countries, developing ones are often perceived
to be riskier due to their coercive inability to control their
national borders, or project power throughout their
national territory. According to Rotberg (2003) most of
these countries continually face the threat of secession,
civil war and large-scale violent internal struggles for con-
trol between the government and one or more non-state
actors, all of which make them riskier and more costly to
do business with. Over time insurers can take advantage of
the heightened uncertainty by raising high premium char-
ges for businesses operating in those zones. This has had a
significant impact on the growth and survival of firms
operating within such regions compared to developed
countries (International Monetary Fund—IMF, 2001).
Notwithstanding this, terrorism is found to have a sig-
nificant impact on the performance of businesses operating
in developed countries although it is short-lived due to
their resource capabilities and high institutional quality
(Tingbani et al., 2019). For instance, a study by Arin,
Ciferri, and Spagnolo (2008) on the responses of businesses
to terror shocks across the six countries investigated
(Indonesia, Israel, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and the UK)
suggested that the impact varies across countries. Specifi-
cally, they found that Spain and the UK generally recov-
ered quickly from the negative effects of terrorism due to
their resource capabilities and high institutional quality
(see Arin, Cifferi and Spagnolo, 2008). In a similar vein,
Essaddam and Karagianis (2013) found that firms operating
in wealthier or more democratic countries face greater vol-
atility in stock returns relative to firms in developing coun-
tries. However, conversely, Llorca-Vivero (2008) found that
the negative consequences of terrorism are greater in devel-
oping countries. The contradictory evidence from
Essaddam and Karagianis (2013) and Llorca-Vivero (2008)
means that it is not clear whether developed or developing
countries are impacted more by terrorism. Given this over-
all evidence, we develop the following hypotheses:
H2 Terrorism has a significant association with business
performance in developed countries.
H3 Terrorism has a significant association with business
performance in developing countries.
2.2.3 | Terrorism and business
performance in fragile states
Most fragile states are characterized by sustained degra-
dation of preconditions relevant for markets to exist as
well such as governance structure, rules of exchange
(Fligstein, 2001) and autonomy (McMillan, 2002) as well
as the institutions needed for the market to function
well—that is, governance mechanisms, disclosure
requirements and functioning judiciary (La Porta
et al., 1998; Rotberg, 2003). As a result, the impact of
terrorism tends to be more severe and pervasive on the
performance of businesses operating in these regions.
According to Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009), trans-
terrorism has growth-limiting effects on fragile states. It
reduces growth by crowding-in government expenditures.
Reade and Lee (2012) argued that businesses operating in
terror-endangered areas, particularly fragile states, are
more likely to face challenges from the organizational
commitment of their workforce compared to their peers
operating in less terror-endangered areas. Several studies
(Warr, 2000; Wilcox, Land, & Hunt, 2003) suggested that
the fear of violence could drive changes in the routine
activities of workers. Such fear also generates organiza-
tional stress, which impacts adversely on employees'
work attitude, and increases their disaffection with host
country nationals in the case of expatriates, which even-
tually impedes their performance (Bader & Berg, 2013).
Bader and Schuster (2015) found that large and diver-
sified social networks positively impact on the psycholog-
ical wellbeing of international expatriates working in
terror-endangered countries and that safety-related intra-
family tensions have a diminishing influence on the
performance of expatriates. Dreher, Krieger, and
Meierrieks (2011) stated that the fear and uncertainty
impact on the individual migration decisions of staff; they
impact on individuals' perceptions of their living and
working conditions, thus forcing them to migrate to safer
locations. This and other induced indirect costs adversely
affect the performance of businesses operating in most
fragile states. On the basis of this, we formulate the
following hypothesis:
H4 Terrorism has a significantly negative impact on busi-
ness performance in fragile states.
3 | SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND
EMPIRICAL METHODS
3.1 | Sample Construction
We sourced our data from the World Bank Ease of Doing
Business Index, the World Bank Development Indicators
(WDI) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). We
employed data from all the global countries for which data
on business performance was available. The sample
(173 countries) was further disaggregated into developed
(40 countries), developing (133 countries), and fragile
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(failed) sub-samples2 (39 countries). However, since the
study was mainly on terrorism, only countries that are
known for terrorism and are regarded as fragile were used.
This category of fragile countries was also adopted by
Okafor and Piesse (2017) in their study of terrorism. This
is because countries such as Zimbabwe and North Korea,
among others, are ranked highest on the fragile index but
are not known for terrorism. Conversely, countries such as
the UK, France and Germany that are highly terror-prone
are not ranked high in the fragile states index. Somalia
was excluded from the sample due to the unavailability of
data. The period 2009–2017 was employed for the analyses.
The sample of countries employed in the data collection is
shown in Tables 1 and 2.
TABLE 1 Sample countries
Afghanistan Comoros Hungary+ Moldova South Africa
Albania Congo Democratic Iceland+ Montenegro South Sudan
Algeria Congo Rep India Morocco Spain+
Angola Costa Rica Indonesia Mozambique Sri Lanka
Antigua and Barbuda Cote d'Ivoire Iran Myanmar St Lucia
Argentina Croatia+ Iraq Namibia St. Kitts and Nevis
Armenia Cyprus+ Ireland+ Nepal Sudan
Australia+ Czech Republic+ Israel+ Netherlands+ Suriname
Austria+ Denmark+ Italy+ New Zealand+ Swaziland
Azerbaijan Djibouti Jamaica Nicaragua Sweden+
Bahamas Dominica Japan+ Niger Switzerland+
Bahrain Dominican Republic Jordan Nigeria Syria
Bangladesh Ecuador Kazakhstan Norway+ Tajikistan
Barbados Egypt Kenya Pakistan Tanzania
Belarus El Salvador Korea Rep+ Panama Thailand
Belgium+ Equatorial Guinea Kosovo Papua New Guinea Timor-Leste
Belize Eritrea Kuwait Paraguay Togo
Benin Estonia+ Kyrgyz Republic Peru Trinidad and Tobago
Bhutan Ethiopia Laos Philippines Tunisia
Bolivia Fiji Latvia+ Poland+ Turkey
Bosnia and Herzegovina Finland+ Lebanon Portugal+ UAE
Botswana France+ Lesotho Qatar Uganda
Brazil Gabon Liberia Romania+ Ukraine
Brunei Darussalam Gambia Libya Russian Federation United Kingdom+
Bulgaria+ Georgia Lithuania+ Rwanda United States+
Burkina Faso Germany+ Luxembourg+ Saudi Arabia Uruguay
Burundi Ghana Madagascar Senegal Uzbekistan
Cambodia Greece+ Malawi Serbia Vanuatu
Cameroon Grenada Malaysia Seychelles Venezuela
Canada+ Guatemala Maldives Sierra Leone Vietnam
Central African Republic Guinea Mali Singapore+ West Bank
Chad Guinea-Bissau Malta+ Slovak Republic+ Yemen
Chile+ Guyana Mauritania Slovenia+ Zambia
China Haiti Mauritius Solomon Islands Zimbabwe
Colombia Honduras Mexico
Note: This table presents the sample of countries employed for our analysis on the impact of terrorism on global business performance over
the period 2009–2017. + is for developed countries.
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3.2 | Variable description
3.2.1 | Dependent variable
The main dependent variable for the study is the distance
to the frontier score,3 in country i at time t. The measure
represents the best performance observed on each of the
Doing Business indicators. Basically, the topics on areas of
Doing Business used in the construction of the distance to
the frontier suggest that countries with lower scores have
a deteriorating business environment and, thus, such
countries are more likely to be characterized by poorer
levels of business performance. For example, a score of
25 means that a country is 75 percentage points away
from the frontier of best performance across all econo-
mies and across time. The topics on areas of Doing Busi-
ness used to construct the frontier include ease in starting
a business, dealing with permits, getting electricity, regis-
tering a property, getting credit, protecting investors, pay-
ing taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and
resolving insolvency. Broadly, some studies have
established links between the quality of institutional
environment and business performance. For example, in
their empirical study, Tingbani et al. (2019) used the
resolving insolvency indicator of the Doing Business Index
to proxy for business failure. [In addition, see Xavier,
Bandeira-de-Mello, & Marcon, 2014 and He, Zhang, &
Wang, 2015] for an extensive review of the relationship
between institutional business environment and busi-
ness.] To further justify our rationale for using this con-
struct as a proxy for business performance, we present
the following discussions based on the topics on areas of
Doing Business, which the World Bank uses in con-
structing the distance to the frontier score.
Economies that experience enormous difficulties in
starting up a business would be characterized by the pres-
ence of numerous informal businesses. It is very important
to formalize a business since most often fail in the first cou-
ple of years of existence (Cressy, 1999). The informal nature
of businesses within such a country means that they “oper-
ate in the shadows” and are afraid of marketing themselves
for fear of the law. They may also not be able to trade with
certain customers or increase their customer base, the con-
sequences of which can be productivity losses, lower sales,
difficulty in accessing finance, and lack of access to govern-
ment benefits (Bruhn & McKenzie, 2014). Similarly, busi-
nesses in economies with inefficient regulatory systems on
construction permits are more likely to underperform. The
absence of basic infrastructures and safety standards that
can be consequences of the inability to easily obtain such
permits is not just costly but can also pose serious opera-
tional challenges for businesses. In contrast, ease in dealing
with such permits can save time for businesses and will
allow them to direct their efforts and resources more effi-
ciently, hence achieving better performance (World
Bank, 2013).
Access to an electricity supply is very important for
businesses to operate and grow. According to a World Bank
report in 2017, businesses in mostly developing countries
perceive difficulty with electricity supply as a major obsta-
cle to their operations (World Bank, 2017a). According to
Abeberese (2012), shortages in electricity can also cause
businesses to reduce their productive investments, with
negative implications for performance. Difficulty in regis-
tering a property for business operations can also create a
burdensome environment for business activities to thrive in
and pose serious challenges for industrial development
(Agboli & Ukaegbu, 2006). Also, the difficulty businesses
encounter in registering their property can reduce their
ability to access credit facilities and also expose them to
incidents of bribery at the land registry. Both scenarios can
have severe consequences for business performance (World
Bank, 2013).
There is evidence to suggest that credit has an impor-
tant role to play in the overall business environment of a
country through its ability to enhance business growth
and productivity. This is because access to credit in a
country can boost the ability of businesses to grow to
their optimal size since there will be lower transaction
costs and lower risk premia (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt,-
2006; Harvie, Narjoko, & Oum, 2013). Economies, where
the interests of investors are not protected, run the risk of
low business performance levels. This is because inves-
tors will be more reluctant to invest their money for fear




Burundi* Kenya* Sri Lanka**
Cameroon* Lebanon*** South Sudan*
Central African Republic* Libya*** Sudan*
Chad* Mali* Syria***
Colombia Mozambique* Thailand
Congo Democratic* Myanmar Tunisia***
Cote d'Ivoire* Nepal** Turkey***
Egypt*** Niger* Uganda*
Ethiopia* Nigeria* West Bank***
India** Pakistan** Yemen***
Note: This table presents the sub-sample of countries employed for
our analysis on the impact of terrorism on business performance in
39 fragile countries over the period 2009–2017. * is for SSA coun-
tries, ** is for South Asian countries and *** is for MENA countries.
TAURINGANA ET AL. 7
of management misusing the funds for personal gains
(Lobet, 2008). Moreover, where investors' interests are
not protected, businesses will struggle to maintain good
corporate governance standards that are necessary for
business performance and growth (Klapper &
Love, 2004). Efficient tax-related procedures are benefi-
cial for businesses because overly complicated tax sys-
tems are associated with large informal sectors and less
investment (World Bank, 2017b). Thus, when tax compli-
ance systems are effectively designed, they encourage
businesses to participate in the formal economy by stimu-
lating investment and enhancing performance
(Baliamoune-Lutz & Garello, 2014; World Bank, 2017b).
The ease of trading across borders is often as a result
of trade liberalization and trade reforms. Businesses
within a country that easily trades internationally often
enjoy favourable economic conditions and can benefit
through the following channels: Improved allocation of
resources, greater competition, and access to better tech-
nologies, inputs and intermediate goods (Boubakri, Cos-
set, & Guedhami, 2005). All of these would enhance the
overall performance and productivity of businesses
(Topalova & Khandelwal, 2011). The ability of a country
to effectively enforce contracts through fair, speedy tri-
als are very important for businesses entangled in dis-
putes. If business disputes take a very long time to
resolve through the courts, firms—particularly the small
ones—may not possess the financial strength to stay in
business that long, regardless of the outcome (World
Bank, 2013). This is because businesses will incur huge
TABLE 3 Variable definitions
Variable category Definitions
Dependent variables
Distance to the frontier (Business
performance)
This measures the distance of each economy to the “frontier,” which represents
the best performance observed. A country's distance to frontier is reflected on a
scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest performance and 100
represents the frontier (WDI, 2017).
Current account balance This measures the difference between a country's trade balance (exports minus
imports). It is represented as a share of GDP (Holmes, 2006).
Independent variables
Number of terrorist incidents (per 100,000 of
population
This captures the number of terrorist incidents in a given year. Terrorism is
defined as the planned use of threat of extra normal violence by subnational
groups to obtain a political, religious or ideological objective through threats to
a large audience, usually not directly involved with the decision making
(GTD, 2019; Ismail & Amjad, 2014).
Number of fatalities and injured (per 100,000
of population
This captures the number fatalities and injured from terror attacks in a given year
(GTD, 2019)
Control variables
Savings (% of GDP) Measures the difference between GDP and total consumption (WDI, 2019).
Credit to private investors (% of GDP) This refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial
corporations, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and
trade credits (WDI, 2017).
Inflation Annual % change in the cost of consumer goods and services (WDI, 2019).
Lending rate (%) This refers to the bank rate that usually meets the short- and medium-term
financing needs of the private sector (WDI, 2019).
GDP per Capita Growth Rate This measures the annual growth rate of gross domestic product per capita
(WDI, 2019)
FDI (% of GDP) This is the net inflows of foreign direct investment in an economy as a share of
GDP. The net inflows of investment are to acquire a lasting management
interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy
other than that of the investor (WDI, 2019)
Trade openness This measures the degree of openness of a country. It is calculated as the sum of
exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP (WDI, 2019)
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) This includes land, plant, machinery, equipment and infrastructural purchases
and improvements including the construction of roads, railways, commercial
and industrial buildings, etc. (WDI, 2019)
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Percentile SD Min. Max.
Dependent variable
Business performance 60.121 37.960 69.268 13.243 20.925 91.240
Alternative measure for the
dependent variable
Current account balance (% of GDP) −3.154 −19.001 1.444 10.199 −65.029 45.454
Key independent variable
Terrorist incidents (per 100,000
of population)
0.184 0.000 0.040 0.826 0.000 11.544
Number of fatalities and injuries
(per 100,000 of population)
0.919 0.000 0.073 5.197 0.000 90.518
Control variables
Saving (% of GDP) 19.490 −6.767 28.025 17.345 −66.922 75.550
Credit to private investors (% of GDP) 66.306 6.499 89.610 57.297 −114.694 317.410
Inflation (%) 5.204 −0.594 6.089 14.396 −6.811 379.848
Lending rate (%) 11.726 3.477 14.808 8.031 0.500 65.418
GDP/Capita growth rate (%) 1.581 −5.405 3.722 5.635 −62.378 121.780
FDI (% of GDP) 8.729 −0.077 5.731 52.288 −28.583 1,282.630
Trade openness 88.869 34.971 105.387 51.771 0.167 408.362
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 24.248 12.899 27.782 8.370 −3.744 85.101
Note: This table presents the summary statistics of the variables employed in the analysis.





Percentile SD Min. Max.
Dependent variable
Business performance 50.869 32.614 57.875 10.717 27.500 78.453
Alternative measure for the dependent variable
Current account balance (% of GDP) −5.591 −22.328 −1.044 9.167 −46.262 29.114
Key Independent variable
Terrorist incidents (per 100,000 of Population) 0.655 0.000 0.401 1.600 0.000 11.544
Number of fatalities and injuries
(per 100,000 of population)
3.828 0.000 1.582 10.436 0.000 90.518
Control variables
Saving (% of GDP) 16.556 −8.515 23.851 13.902 −30.939 48.452
Credit to private investors (% of GDP) 40.082 −1.864 57.395 39.038 −114.694 202.879
Inflation (%) 8.589 −0.039 8.892 24.352 −6.811 379.848
Lending rate (%) 12.281 5.039 15.148 7.093 4.334 28.447
GDP/Capita growth rate (%) 2.280 −5.920 4.789 9.349 −62.378 121.780
FDI (% of GDP) 2.747 −0.036 3.115 4.574 −4.852 39.456
Trade openness 59.199 30.885 72.023 24.447 0.167 139.676
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 24.990 13.204 30.985 9.170 0.000 53.988
Note: This table presents the summary statistics of the variables employed in the analysis for the fragile countries.
Source: WDI (2019) and GTD (2019).
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costs in pursuing legal means to protect themselves
against uncompetitive behaviours such as piracy, con-
tract violations, counterfeiting, and false advertising
(Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011). Therefore, effective contract
systems have great significance for business perfor-
mance as they can reduce informality, improve access to
credit, promote investment, and increase trade (World
Bank, 2013). Last, effective insolvency laws can stimu-
late the reorganization of businesses and enhance their
performance and survival (Dewaelheyns & Van
Hulle, 2008). They can save struggling businesses when
possible, or reallocate insolvent resources of failing
firms more productively, thereby speeding up their
recovery. Investors and entrepreneurs are more willing
to commit to productive activities when they know they
are not putting their entire personal fortunes in jeopardy
(Cirmizi, Klapper, & Uttamchandani, 2011).
3.2.2 | Independent variables
Our main independent variables are the number of ter-
rorist incidents and the number of fatalities and injured.
We normalized our main independent variables per
100,000 of the population as this would allow for better
comparability across countries. Furthermore, using the
numbers of fatalities and injured would also enhance the
analysis as it allows an investigation of the severity of ter-
ror attacks.
3.2.3 | Control variables
The study also used control variables that can impact on
business performance. These variables mainly proxy for
financial development, productivity and economic open-
ness. According to the available literature, financial
development has positive implications for a country's
long-run level of real activity (Boyd, Levine, &
Smith, 2001). Financial development comes with better
economies of scale, increased supervision and regulation
and sustainable competition. This we argue will mitigate
against the performance and growth of businesses, since
there will be higher levels of savings, greater availability
of credit, lower levels of inflation and more efficient lend-
ing rates within that economy. Banks and other lending
institutions often create loans from savings. This means
that businesses are less likely to be credit-constrained in
countries with access to savings and credit (Demirguc-
Kunt & Levine, 2001; Lensink, Servin, & Berg, 2017).
According to Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008),
studies have shown that firms benefitted immensely in




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10 TAURINGANA ET AL.
Tsoukas (2011) also showed that financial development
played an important role in firm performance; that is,
more liquid markets improved the survival chances of
firms. In contrast, inflation and high lending rates can
erode the profit and increase the cost of doing business,
respectively. The latter can also imply that firms find it
difficult to access credit, resulting in a fall in competitive-
ness, cost efficiency and performance levels.
With respect to productivity, we used the growth rate
in per capita income and gross fixed capital formation.
There is evidence to suggest a positive relationship between
changes in per capita growth rate, investment, return on
capital (Gruber & Kamin, 2007) and subsequently business
performance (Ma, Yao, & Xi, 2006). Gross fixed capital for-
mation can also motivate the business performance
through its impact on economic output (Jiang,
Laurenceson, & Tang, 2008). For general economic open-
ness, trade openness and FDI were used. Trade openness is
often used in literature to capture a country's connected-
ness to the global market. A country with fewer barriers
can be attractive for foreign capital and, thus, can positively
impact business performance (Moral-Benito &
Roehn, 2016). In addition, there is empirical evidence to
suggest that FDI in an economy can have a positive spill-
over effect on the performance of firms within an economy
(Buckley, Clegg, & Wang, 2002; Cubillo Pinilla, 2008). See
Table 3 for variable category and description.
3.3 | Preliminary data analysis
Tables 4 and 5 show the descriptive statistics of the var-
iables used. On average, the business performance mea-
sure is around the 60% points. The minimum is at
around the 21% points while the maximum is at around
the 91% points. The sub-samples in Table 5 show that,
at the mean, the group of fragile countries achieve busi-
ness performance at around the 51% points. While the
minimum is 27.5% points, the maximum is around 78%
points. The percentiles show that, overall, 25% of coun-
tries in the sample have business performance that is
less than 37.9% points. However, the fragile countries
have values at the 25th percentile that are below the
32.6% points. The fragile countries on average record
the highest number of terrorist incidents (per 100,000
of population) and number of fatalities and injured (per
100,000 of population). At the mean, about 0.04 terror-
ist incidents (per 100,000 of population) and 0.073 fatal-
ities and injured (per 100,000 of population) were
recorded over the period under review in the overall
sample of countries. The values for the fragile countries
are 0.40 and 1.58, respectively. The rest of the descrip-
tive analysis can be interpreted from Tables 4 and 7.
The correlation matrix is reported in Tables 6 and 7. As
can be seen, there are no obvious multicollinearity
concerns.
TABLE 7 Correlation matrix (Fragile and Terror-prone Countries)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Business performance 1.000
2 Current account






4 Number of fatalities
and injuries (per
100,000 of population)
−0.233 −0.034 0.874 1.000
5 Saving (% of GDP) 0.133 0.532 −0.113 −0.024 1.000
6 Credit to private
investors (% of GDP)
0.555 −0.111 −0.179 −0.187 −0.038 1.000
7 Inflation (%) −0.149 0.049 −0.037 0.008 0.139 −0.047 1.000
8 Lending rate (%) −0.201 −0.078 −0.033 0.039 −0.050 −0.229 0.046 1.000
9 GDP/Capita growth rate (%) 0.046 0.230 −0.108 −0.075 0.067 0.028 −0.172 −0.009 1.000
10 FDI (% of GDP) 0.041 −0.546 −0.211 −0.211 −0.119 0.042 −0.133 0.109 0.060 1.000
11 Trade openness 0.096 −0.135 0.267 0.164 −0.016 0.098 −0.244 −0.205 −0.029 0.256 1.000
12 Gross fixed capital
formation (% of GDP)
0.148 −0.221 −0.179 −0.159 0.415 0.094 −0.056 −0.081 0.229 0.356 0.056 1.000











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12 TAURINGANA ET AL.
4 | EMPIRICAL APPROACH
4.1 | The Baseline Specification and
Method
The modelling uses a panel of 173 countries. The panel of
countries was further disaggregated into developed,
developing and fragile countries. The data are annual
and for the period 2009–2017. The data were estimated
using a fixed-effects technique, as this was favoured by
the Hausman test4 against the random effects. There are
numerous advantages for using a fixed-effects technique.
First, the technique can address heterogeneity across
countries, as revealed in the summary statistics. This
eliminates the risk of obtaining biased estimates that
could arise due to countries operating under different
political, regulatory and business environments. Second,
the technique allows for different intercepts for the indi-
vidual countries in the sample, but still maintains con-
stant slope coefficients. Third, by also allowing for the
cross-section and the time aspects of the panel data, more
explanatory power is added to the regressions, thus
increasing the degrees of freedom of the model
(Baltagi, 1995; Gujarati, 2004). The estimating equation
can be expressed as
Yit = αi + βXit +XCtΓ+ μi + vit, ð1Þ
where Y is the business performance in country i at time
t. XCt is a matrix of independent and control variables
and α and β are the coefficients to be estimated. μi and vit
represent the disturbance term—country-specific effects
and random errors distributed. An expanded version of
Equation (1) is expressed as
Yit = αi + βTerror incidentsit + βSavingsit
+ βCredit to private investorsit + β Inflationit
+ βLending rateit + βGDP=Capita Growthit + βFDIit
+ βTrade opennessit + βGross fixed capitalit μi + vit,
ð2Þ
and
Yit = αi + βFatalities and injuredit + βSavingsit
+ βCredit to private investorsit + β Inflationit
+ βLending rateit + βGDP=Capita Growthit
+ βFDIit + βTrade opennessit
+ βGross fixed capitalit μi + vit,
ð3Þ
The model was first estimated for the entire sample
(173 countries). This was followed by disaggregating into
developed (40 countries), developing (133 countries), and
fragile terror-prone countries (39 countries). Finally,
regional (SSA, South Asia and MENA) dummies were
































(per 100,000 of population)
−0.214 −1.082* −0.311
(1.821) (0.588) (0.290)
Number of fatalities and injuries
(per 100,000 of population)
0.138 −0.244*** −0.067
(0.211) (0.088) (0.044)
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 49.632*** 49.901*** 50.198*** 50.948*** 50.058*** 50.451***
(2.373) (2.340) (2.408) (2.403) (2.408) (2.399)
F stat 8.230 8.700 8.380 8.930 8.330 8.72
p > F .000 .000 .000 .000 .015 .000
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 231
R-squared within 0.443 0.457 0.448 0.464 0.446 0.458
Note: Values in the table have been approximated to 3 decimal places. For brevity, the control variables are not reported.
Note: This table presents the regression results of the marginal effects of the fragile countries. *Significance at the 10% Level; **Significance
at the 5% Level; ***Significance at the 1% Level.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14 TAURINGANA ET AL.
interacted5 with the independent variables in order to
observe differences in the marginal effects across these
regional sub-samples. The inclusion of the regional
dummies of SSA, South Asia and MENA is because coun-
tries in these regions are the most terror-prone in the top-
ranked category of fragile states index (Okafor &
Piesse, 2017). Also, these countries contribute a very sig-
nificant share of global terrorism. The time period of the
panel data is very short; hence, unit root test and co-
integration are not suitable. Moreover, these tests are best
suited for time-series studies.
4.2 | Empirical Evidence
The baseline results are shown in Tables 8 and 9. For the
entire sample estimation (Models 1 and 2), the number of
terrorist incidents was negative but insignificant while
the number of fatalities and injured was negative and sig-
nificant. Therefore, hypothesis 1 (H1) is rejected. Savings,
FDI and trade openness are positive and significant. The
results in Table 8 (Models 3 to 6), also show that both
measures of terrorism are negative but do not have a sig-
nificant impact on business performance in developed
and developing countries. Thus, there is enough empiri-
cal evidence to reject our hypotheses 2 and 3 (H2 and
H3). Although trade openness remained positive and sig-
nificant across the different categories, savings and FDI
only remained positive and significant in the sample of
developing countries. Credit to private investors and GDP
per capita growth are positive and significant in the sam-
ple of developed countries.
The results in Table 8 (Models 7 and 8) show that
there is a negative and significant relationship between
both measures of terrorism and business performance
in fragile countries. Therefore, hypothesis 4 (H4) is
accepted. An increase in the numbers of terrorist inci-
dents, and the numbers of fatalities and injured by
1 per 100,000 of population, will significantly reduce
business performance by 0.43% and 0.09% points,
respectively. Surprisingly, the severity of terrorism does
not seem to have any greater impact on business per-
formance. In addition, credit to private investors was
negative and significant. The rest of the control vari-
ables were insignificant except for inflation, which was
only significant in Model 3 of Table 8. Results of the
marginal effects analysis with respect to the fragile
countries are presented in Table 9. An increase in the
numbers of terrorist incidents, and the numbers of
fatalities and injured by 1 per 100,000 of population,
will significantly reduce business performance by 1.08
and 0.24% points, respectively, for South Asia. While
this result is not surprising with respect to SSA, it is for
the MENA countries. This is because South Asia
records more terrorism per 100,000 of population com-
pared to SSA but less in comparison to MENA.
































(per 100,000 of population)
−1.197 −5.092*** 0.507
(2.351) (0.679) (0.333)
Number of fatalities and injuries
(per 100,000 of population)
−0.735** −0.809*** 0.033
(0.327) (0.106) (0.051)
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 6.751** 7.548*** 8.769*** 9.819*** 8.907*** 10.103***
(2.857) (2.786) (2.529) (2.542) (2.551) (2.501)
F stat 9.820 11.320 18.010 18.060 17.460 19.330
p > F .000 .000 .000 .000 .015 .000
Observations 223 223 223 223 223 223
R-squared within 0.344 0.377 0.491 0.491 0.483 0.508
Note: Values in the table have been approximated to 3 decimal places. For brevity, the control variables are not reported.
Note: This table presents the regression results of the marginal effects of the fragile countries. *Significance at the 10% Level; **Significance
at the 5% Level; ***Significance at the 1% Level.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16 TAURINGANA ET AL.
The finding that terrorism does not have a robust sig-
nificant impact on business performance at country level
can be interpreted in the light of number of studies on
stock market performance (e.g., Arif & Sulemon, 2017;
Brounrn & Derwell, 2010; Ramiah et al., 2010) and
demand for tourism (e.g., Drakos & Kutan, 2003; Pizam &
Smith, 2000; Yaya, 2009) depending on the interpreta-
tion. It could be argued that our findings are inconsistent
with some existing studies. Nevertheless, these studies
often show that terrorism either has a very small negative
effect (e.g., Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008) or the effect
actually lasts for a matter of days or a few months
(Aslam & Kang, 2015; Becker & Murphy, 2001;
Nikkinena, Omranb, Sahlströmc, & Äijöa, 2008). In addi-
tion, our findings, that terrorism does not have an effect
on both the developed and developing countries' sub-
samples, contribute to the limited and contradictory evi-
dence on whether developed or developing countries are
more affected by terrorism. This could be explained by
the fact that consequences of terrorism may be temporal
if there are mechanisms and institutional structures in
place that can help cushion its negative effects (Oh &
Oetzel, 2011). Our findings of no difference in the impact
of terrorism between developed and developing countries
are inconsistent with some studies (see Llorca-Vivero,-
2008; Procasky & Ujah, 2016).
Our finding of the significant negative relationship
between terrorism and business performance only in the
sample of fragile countries is because these groups of
countries record by far the highest share of global terror-
ism. The fragile countries are also known to lack institu-
tional mechanisms and structures that can help reduce or
cushion the effects of terrorism. Terrorism is known to
crowd out businesses' productive activities by raising the
cost of capital and labour. In addition, the results could
also suggest that the inability to trade across borders or
across intra-country regions, lack of competitiveness, and
loss of economic activity that can all be associated with
terrorism have negatively affected the ability of these
countries to be at the frontier of business performance.
The findings are consistent with the “institution voids”
explanation since, in such countries, there is sustained
degradation for markets to exist and lack of governance
structures and functioning judiciary (see Fligstein, 2001;
La Porta et al., 1998; Rotberg, 2003). Thus, while hypoth-
esis 2 is confirmed, there is not enough empirical evi-
dence for hypothesis 1.
The finding of a consistent positive and significant
impact of the savings variable in the sample of develop-
ing countries is consistent with Aghion, Comin, Howitt,
and Tecu (2016) who suggested that savings, particularly
in poorer countries, matter a great deal more for innova-
tion, productivity and growth because catching up with
the frontier requires efforts from foreign investors and
domestic banks or domestic entrepreneurs. Such efforts
promote cooperative ventures; this in turn eases an




























(per 100,000 of population)
−0.792 −1.431** −0.450
(1.903) (0.580) (0.283)
Number of fatalities and injuries
(per 100,000 of population)
0.135 −0.247*** −0.126***
(0.210) (0.087) (0.042)
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 53.430*** 53.822*** 54.111*** 54.446*** 54.099*** 54.048***
(2.427) (2.353) (2.450) (2.409) (2.455) (2.408)
F stat 6.530 7.530 6.770 7.540 6.740 7.390
p > F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
R-squared within 0.401 0.436 0.4094 0.436 0.408 0.431
Note: Time and year fixed effects were included. Values in the table have been approximated to 3 decimal places. For brevity, the control vari-
ables are not reported.
Note: This table presents the regression results of the estimations for the entire sample and sub-samples. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significance at the 10% Level; **Significance at the 5% Level; ***Significance at the 1% Level.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18 TAURINGANA ET AL.
agency problem that has the potential to deter foreign
investors from participating in them. But in richer coun-
tries closer to the frontier, this is less so because they do
not need foreign investment to undergo innovation pro-
jects that are necessary for productivity and growth. The
mixed findings of the relationship between credit to pri-
vate investors and business performance is consistent
with the arguments by Boyreau-Debray (2003) and
Tsoukas (2011) that credit might not always positively
relate to performance. Inflation is negative but mainly
insignificant, but nevertheless confirms the notion that
inflation erodes the value of investment and profit, and
adds additional cost to a business's operating activities.
Lending rate and gross fixed capital were insignificant
across all models. Trade openness and FDI were positive
but the significance of the FDI was not robust across all
the models. The positive relationship confirms the
importance of global market links to business
performance.
4.3 | Robustness to Alternative
Specifications
We carried out some robustness analyses by employing
an alternative dependent variable measure and
estimation technique. Our measure of business perfor-
mance (Doing Business) was replaced with the Current
Account Balance in country i at time t. The Current
Account Balance (% of GDP) measures the difference
between a country's trade balance (exports revenue
minus imports expenditure) (Holmes, 2006). A positive
current account reflects an economy's degree of competi-
tiveness, investment, exports, and increasing terms of
trade (Zemanek, Belke, & Schnabl, 2010). All of these
have important implications and direct positive relation-
ships with business performance. For example, Sousa,
Martínez-López, and Coelho (2008) carried out an exten-
sive review of the relationships between competitiveness,
exports and business performance. Empirical studies by
Singh (2009) also support the link between competitive-
ness, performance and export propensity or intensity.
Also, there is a potential that our results may suffer
from reverse causality (endogeneity). The lack of entre-
preneurial activities and incidents of poor business per-
formance can lead to high unemployment rates, which,
in turn, can lower the opportunity costs of joining terror-
ist organizations. Thus, the relationship can also run
from business performance to terrorism. To help address
endogeneity concerns, we estimated our data using the
General Method of Moments (GMM). Unfortunately,
these were not reported because the estimates were
TABLE 15 Marginal Effects of Fragile Regions—Robustness Checks using Alternative Business Performance Measure Lagged Values
of the Independent Variables

























(per 100,000 of population)
−0.138 −2.337*** 0.354
(1.859) (0.360) (0.617)
Number of fatalities and injuries
(per 100,000 of population)
−0.178 −0.395*** −0.047
(0.322) (0.063) (0.057)
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 2.334 2.407 4.085 4.139 4.075 4.062
(4.667) (4.691) (4.455) (4.599) (4.465) (4.444)
F stat 5.070 4.680 89.350 162.110 29.580 39.930
p > F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202
R-squared within 0.188 0.213 0.230 0.239 0.227 0.243
Note: Time and Year fixed effects were included. Values in the table have been approximated to 3 decimal places. For brevity, the control var-
iables are not reported.
Note: This table presents the regression results of the estimations for the entire sample and sub-samples. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significance at the 10% Level; **Significance at the 5% Level; ***Significance at the 1% Level.
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inconsistent due to the inefficiency of the instruments.
This is not particularly surprising because GMM is best
suited for panels with large cross-sections and small
time-series (Baltagi, 2013). Econometrically, the 2SLS can
also address problems of endogeneity. However, it was
not feasible to get instruments that impact on business
performance only through the channel of terrorism.
Thus, we used the lagged explanatory variables to esti-
mate our models. This approach has been supported and
used by several studies such as Afonso and Jalles (2013)
and Bellemare, Masaki, and Pepinsky (2017). This is
because Yt cannot possibly cause Xt − 1 so, by replacing Xt
with Xt − 1, we can eliminate the concerns that X is
endogenous to Y.
Tables 10 and 11 show estimations of the alternative
dependent measure (current account balance, percentage
of GDP). The results are mainly similar and consistent
with those of the baseline regression although the num-
ber of fatalities and injured is now negative and signifi-
cant for the SSA region. Tables 12–15 are estimates of the
lagged regressors. Interestingly, the number of fatalities
and injured is negative and significant except for the sam-
ple of developed countries. These results may confirm the
better institutional structures and mechanisms available
in developed countries that can help cushion the severity
of the impact of terrorism although, similar to the base-
line regression, there also is no evidence to suggest that
the severity of terrorism will have a greater impact on
business performance. From the data, it will be difficult
to investigate why this is the case. However, a speculative
reason may be that terror incidents that recorded fewer
numbers of fatalities and injured could have had a more
direct impact on business activities.
5 | CONCLUSION AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
This study investigated the impact of terrorism on global
business performance. To achieve this, we used a panel data
fixed-effect regressionmodel on a global sample of 173 coun-
tries over the period 2009–2017. To proxy for business per-
formance, we used a measure of the distance to the frontier
score that captures the best performance observed on each
area of Doing Business across all economies. The results of
the fixed-effects estimations showed that, for the full sam-
ple, terrorism is not significantly related to business perfor-
mance. We then partitioned our sample into developed,
developing and fragile countries on the basis of existing lit-
erature that terrorism may affect these categories of coun-
tries differently. The findings suggest that terrorism does
not have a significant effect on business performance in
both developed and developing countries, but we found that
terrorism does have a significant effect on business perfor-
mance in fragile countries. However, the marginal effects
showed that this significance is only sustained for the South
Asian countries. Our results are robust and considerably
consistent to (a) severity of terrorism (number of fatalities
and injured), (b) an alternative measure of business perfor-
mance and (c) an estimation technique that controls for
potential endogeneity.
Our results contribute to the existing academic litera-
ture on the impact of terrorism on business performance
in many ways. For example, the study contributes by
showing that terrorism does not affect business perfor-
mance equally across different country classifications.
Thus, these results contribute to the limited and contra-
dictory evidence on whether terrorism affects developing
or developed countries more (e.g., Llorca-Vivero, 2008;
Piazza, 2008; Procasky & Ujah, 2016). Finally, we also
contribute to the existing literature by showing that ter-
rorism does have a negative effect on business perfor-
mance in fragile countries. This is because, in fragile
countries, there are usually problems with institutional
structures and mechanisms that may help cushion the
negative impact of terrorism.
In terms of policy implications, the findings suggest
that businesses need not overly avoid countries due to
terrorism and there is no evidence to suggest that it sig-
nificantly impacts on business performance. However,
this is different for fragile countries that are terror-prone.
Such countries should take necessary steps to minimize
the incidents of terrorism including pursuing institu-
tional structures and mechanism that can help cushion
the negative effects of terrorism. Since the results of this
study suggest and seem to confirm that terrorism has no
significant negative effect except in the case of fragile
countries, future research may need to focus on how long
the effect of terrorism may last on overall business perfor-
mance in those countries and how different institutional
structures and mechanisms may help moderate its
impact. Although there is anecdotal evidence of how long
the effects of terrorism last in terms of stock markets and







1 These areas of topics are ease in starting a business, getting per-
mits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit,
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protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders,
enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency.
2 See the FSI, 2019 report for fragile countries' ranking.
3 Calculating the distance to frontier score for each economy
involves two main steps. In the first step, individual component
indicators are normalised to a common unit where each of the
component indicators y (except for the total tax rate) is rescaled
using the linear transformation (worst-y)/(worst-frontier). In the
second step, the scores obtained for individual indicators for each
economy are aggregated through simple averaging into one dis-
tance to frontier score, first for each topic and then across all the
topics of the areas of Doing Business. For more information, please
see World Bank (2017c).
4 Hausman is a general test for specification of an econometric
model that is applied to test for the appropriateness between the
random and the fixed-effects models (Nerlove, 2005).
5 An interaction is formed as a product of two (or more) variables.
An important application of the interaction variables is that it
allows for differences in the slopes of two regression lines. For fur-
ther reading, see Dielman (2005).
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